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FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 501

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FRAME GENERAL

PARIS TELNO 449:

FRANCO-GERMAN INITIATIVE ON POLITICAL UNION

SUMMARY

1. JOINT KOHL/MITTERAND MESSAGE TO HAUGHEY OSTENSIBLY RESTORES FRANCO-GERMAN HARMONY ON POLITICAL UNION BEFORE THE DUBLIN SUMMIT. INITIATIVE IS PROCEDURAL. PLENTY OF BONN/PARIS DIVERGENCIES ON SUBSTANCE. GERMANS ARE DENYING THAT FIRM DATES ARE BEING PRESCRIBED EITHER FOR THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE POLITICAL UNION OR FOR MOVEMENT BEYOND STAGE I IN EMU.

DETAIL

2. BITTERLICH (CHANCELLERY) HAS TOLD US THAT OFFICIALS WORKED ON THE TEXT OF THE JOINT LETTER TO HAUGHEY OVER EASTER CONSULTING KOHL BY TELEPHONE DURING HIS HOLIDAY. THE AIM HAD BEEN TO DEMONSTRATE HARMONY BETWEEN BONN AND PARIS BEFORE THE DUBLIN SUMMIT. VON KYAW (AUSWAERTIGES AMT) HAS ADDED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO FEEL UNDER PRESSURE TO MAKE GOOD ITS EUROPEAN CREDENTIALS IN FRENCH EYES. THE TEXT (ENGLISH TRANSLATION FAXED TO ARTHUR ECD(I)) SAYS THAT THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL PRESENT 'THESE IDEAS' FOR DISCUSSION AT THE INFORMAL DUBLIN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON 21 APRIL. VON KYAW HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS.

3. VON KYAW SAID HE DOUBTED IF ON SATURDAY THE TWO MINISTERS WOULD GO BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE JOINT LETTER WHICH WAS PROCEDURAL AND WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, WENT NO FURTHER THAN THE APPROACH WHICH HE HAD ALREADY INDICATED TO US BONN WAS LIKELY TO ADOPT TOWARDS A SECOND IGC. HE ARGUED THAT GENSCHER WOULD NOT WANT TO SAY MORE AT DUBLIN, IF ONLY BECAUSE THERE WAS FAR FROM BEING AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARIS AND BONN ON THE FOUR POINTS THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE ASKED TO CONSIDER. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, HE SAID THAT ON REINFORCING THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE COMMUNITY (POINT ONE), THE FRENCH LAID

STRESS ON INCREASING THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL, WHEREAS THE GERMANS WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMISSION AND PARLIAMENT. THE FRENCH WERE ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF A SECOND PARLIAMENTARY CHAMBER WHICH BONN COULD ACCEPT BUT WERE LESS ENAMoured OF.

e | 4. ON INCREASING EFFICIENCY OF THE INSTITUTIONS (POINT 2), THE FRENCH WERE FLOATING THE IDEA OF REPLACING COREPER AMBASSADORS BY MINISTERS OR VICE-MINISTERS. BONN WAS NOT KEEN. THERE WAS REAL DIVERGENCE OVER THE MEANING OF ENSURING THE COHERENCE BETWEEN ECONOMIC, MONETARY AND POLITICAL FIELDS (POINT 3). THE GERMANS SAW THIS AS MEANING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, GETTING EXISTING INSTITUTIONS TO WORK BETTER TOGETHER AND, ESPECIALLY, GETTING BETTER COORDINATION BETWEEN POLITICAL COOPERATION AND COMMUNITY EXTERNAL POLICY (AND THUS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND COREPER). FRENCH IDEAS WERE MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS. THEY SAW ECONOMIC UNION, MONETARY UNION AND POLITICAL UNION AS THREE ENTIRELY SEPARATE DOMAINS WHICH SHOULD SO REMAIN, ONLY BEING BROUGHT TOGETHER AT THE TOP UNDER A EUROPEAN PRESIDENT, ELECTED FOR FOUR YEARS.... ETC. VON KYAW AVOIDED SAYING THAT BONN WOULD VETO THIS, BUT HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE WHOLE IDEA FAIRLY MAD WHICH WOULD DAMAGINGLY DEVALUE THE EXISTING ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. THE FRENCH ANSWER HAD APPARENTLY BEEN THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL COULD BE A VICE PRESIDENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF EUROPE.

5. ON POINT FOUR (COMMON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY) VON KYAW SAID HE SUPPOSED (THIS IS NOT HIS SIDE OF THE HOUSE) THAT THE GERMAN AIM WAS TO ADVANCE A BIT FURTHER DOWN THE SINGLE ACT ROAD OF INCREASING THE COMPETENCE OF POLITICAL COOPERATION IN SECURITY MATTERS. THE FRENCH HOWEVER, HE SUSPECTED, HAD MUCH GREATER AMBITIONS. THEY SAW DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY AS PART OF POLITICAL UNION. THUS THEY WOULD COME UNDER THE EUROPEAN PRESIDENT. PARIS, HE THOUGHT WANTED TO SEIZE THIS MOMENT IN EUROPEAN AND EAST WEST AFFAIRS TO GIVE THE COMMUNITY A DEFENCE ROLE.

COMMENT

6. AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARIS AND BONN MAY BE MORE OSTENSIBLE THAN REAL. THE MAIN EFFECT OF THE LETTER TO HAUGHEY IS TO RAISE THE PROFILE OF POLITICAL UNION AS AN ITEM ON THE COMMUNITY AGENDA AND CREATE UNWELCOME TIME PRESSURE. BUT HERE TOO IT LOOKS AS IF BONN/PARIS CRACKS ARE BEING PAPERED OVER. VON KYAW BLAMED THE FRENCH, SAYING, SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY, THAT BONN MOST CERTAINLY DID NOT INSIST ON PARALLELISM IN TIMING OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF POLITICAL UNION AND EMU. IT WAS 'ONLY A SUGGESTION' THAT THE TARGET DATE FOR BOTH SHOULD BE 1 JANUARY 1993. BITTERLICH HAS ALSO BEEN AT

PAINS TO PURSUADE US THAT THE GERMAN POSITION ON THE EMU IGC
REMAINED UNCHANGED BY THIS INITIATIVE. CERTAINLY THE GERMANS HAVE
NOT CONCEDED AN EARLIER STARTING DATE. AS FOR THE FINISHING DATE,
BITTERLICH ARGUES THAT THERE IS NOTHING MAGIC ABOUT 1 JANUARY 1993.
MOVEMENT BEYOND STAGE I CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE AS AND WHEN THE TREATY
AMENDMENTS, WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA, SPECIFY.

NEVILLE-JONES

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ADDITIONAL 1

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