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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA

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2 PLUS 4 MINISTERIAL : BONN, 5 MAY : BREAKFAST WITH GENSCHER AND DUMAS

1. AT A TRIPARTITE BREAKFAST BEFORE THE 2 PLUS 4 MINISTERIAL GENSCHER ASKED KASTRUP TO REPORT ON THE FRG'S MEETING ON 4 MAY WITH SHEVARDNADZE. THE LATTER HAD EXPLAINED WHY THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED A SEPARATE AGENDA ITEM ON SYNCHRONIZATION. ON THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNITY SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE TWO GERMAN STATES COMING TOGETHER, INDEED THE SOONER THE BETTER, SINCE ECONOMICALLY THAT WOULD ALSO BE TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE. BUT ON EXTERNAL ASPECTS HE HAD GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT SEEKING TO CONCLUDE MATTERS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, ESPECIALLY ON THE POLITICO/MILITARY STATUS OF A UNITED GERMANY AND ALSO ON FOUR-POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE EXTERNAL ASPECTS COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH SO RAPIDLY. A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WAS NEEDED, WHICH COULD LAST FROM TWO TO FIVE YEARS. MEANWHILE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE IDEA OF ALL GERMAN ELECTIONS, LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF AN ALL GERMAN GOVERNMENT, GOING AHEAD WHILE THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

2. SHEVARDNADZE REPEATED THAT HE HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE ACCELERATION OF GERMAN UNITY AND NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ARTICLE 23 ROUTE. BUT THE RUSSIANS NEEDED TIME. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS SHOULD BE SEPARATED. IF A UNITED GERMANY WERE TO BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO THIS COULD LEAD TO INCALCULABLE DEVELOPMENTS. THE SOVIET UNION REALISED THAT THE GERMANS THEMSELVES WERE IN FAVOUR OF THIS AND THAT THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY THEIR ALLIES. BUT IT HAD TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD NO SUPPORT FROM THEIR OWN PEOPLE FOR THIS AND COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. GORBACHEV HAD SAID TO SHEVARDNADZE RECENTLY THAT POLLS SHOWED SOME 97 PER CENT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE WERE AGAINST A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. THE TIMES HAD CHANGED. THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN MOSCOW ON MAY DAY SHOWED THIS. SUCH FORCES HAD TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. NO POLITICAL EXCUSE SHOULD BE PROVIDED WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEING FORCED TO STEP DOWN. SHEVARDNADZE HAD AT THIS POINT MADE DARK REFERENCES TO

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POSSIBILITIES OF ANARCHY, DICTATORSHIP AND EVEN MONARCHIST TENDENCIES. THE SOVIET UNION NEEDED UNDERSTANDING. THE SITUATION WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THEY NEEDED TIME TO CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT THE COURSE THEY WERE GOING TO TAKE WAS RIGHT. THEREFORE A COMPROMISE WAS NEEDED BETWEEN ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL ASPECTS NOW AND THE EXTERNAL ONES LATER.

3. COMMENTING ON THIS, GENSCHER SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS RESIGNED TO GERMAN UNITY TAKING PLACE IN 1991. IN HIS OWN VIEW THE RUSSIANS WOULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT NATO MEMBERSHIP BY A UNITED GERMANY, IF IN THE MEANTIME THEY COULD SEE ENOUGH IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW STRUCTURES IN EUROPE. GENSCHER HAD HIMSELF EXPLAINED THE ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT WAS ALL VERY WELL BUT HOW DID THEY KNOW IT WOULD ALL HAPPEN? GENSCHER SAID HE FOUND IT REMARKABLE THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD EXPRESSED NO RESERVATION AT ALL ON ARTICLE 23. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO WERE ON THE LINE SHEVARDNADZE HAD TAKEN, GENSCHER SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IF CONFIRMED THE WAY THE SOVIET THINKING WAS EVOLVING, FROM EARLIER INSISTENCE ON GERMAN NEUTRALITY, TO A DEMAND FOR MEMBERSHIP BY GERMANY BY BOTH ALLIANCES, TO THE PRESENT POINT WHERE IN EFFECT THEY WOULD BE CLAIMING THAT EAST GERMANY REMAINED WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION AND THAT SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED THERE AS A VISIBLE EXPRESSION OF THIS. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR THE RUSSIANS THAT FOUR-POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD CONTINUE FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. DUMAS ASKED HOW GENSCHER REACTED TO THIS LATTER POINT. GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REFLECT ON IT.

4. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED POLAND WITH SHEVARDNADZE. IT EMERGED THAT SHEVARDNADZE WAS VERY CONCERNED NOT TO ALLOW THE POLES TO WIDEN BEYOND THE BORDER QUESTION THE BASIS FOR THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE 2 PLUS 4 DISCUSSION. IT APPEARED THAT SHEVARDNADZE FEARED ANY GENERAL DISCUSSION ON SECURITY WITH THE POLES WOULD LEAD THEM TO QUESTION THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR, SINCE THIS HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR ANY RESIDUAL SOVIET TROOP PRESENCE IN POLAND. GENSCHER SAID THAT ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE THE DRAFT POLISH/GERMAN TREATY, HIS OWN TALKS WITH POLISH LEADERS EARLIER THIS WEEK IN WARSAW HAD APPEARED TO CONVINCE THE LATTER THAT THE FRG PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION TO BE CONVEYED TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT BY THE TWO GERMAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. GENSCHER THEN HAD AN INTERPRETER READ OUT THE MAIN PASSAGES FROM THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (AS HE HAD IN BRUSSELS EARLIER THIS WEEK). BUT ON THURSDAY 3 MAY, AT THE MORE DETAILED TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN

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POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND THE POLES IN WARSAW, THE POLES HAD GONE BACK TO SQUARE ONE AND SAID THAT WHAT THE GERMANS WERE NOW PROPOSING DID NOT MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE KNEW FROM SKUBISZEWSKI'S RECENT MESSAGE TO US THAT THE POLES WERE STILL HANKERING AFTER PRIOR INITIALLING OF THE TREATY BEFORE GERMAN UNITY. BUT WHAT GENSCHER WAS PROMISING SOUNDED REASONABLE AND HE WOULD REVERT TO THIS WITH SKUBISZEWSKI WHEN HE SAW HIM IN LONDON NEXT WEEK.

5. MORE GENERALLY, GENSCHER SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED ANXIOUS THAT THE 2 PLUS 4 MINISTERIAL IN BONN TODAY SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE OUTCOME. HE APPEARED NOT TO WANT OPEN CONFRONTATION.

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