

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO DESKBY 070700Z BONN

TELNO 323

OF 061200Z MAY 90

INFO DESKBY 070500Z MOSCOW

INFO DESKBY 070700Z PARIS, EAST BERLIN, UKDEL NATO, WARSAW

INFO DESKBY 071400Z WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER CSCE POSTS

TWO PLUS FOUR MINISTERIAL: BONN 5 MAY
SUMMARY

1. SERIOUS AND CONCILIATORY ATMOSPHERE. AGENDA AND PACE OF FURTHER MEETINGS AGREED. POLES TO BE INVITED TO THE NEXT MINISTERIAL BUT ONE IN PARIS. SOVIET UNION ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AFTER UNITY BY MEANS OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD DURING WHICH FOUR POWER RIGHTS WOULD BE EXTENDED PENDING SATISFACTION OF OPEN QUOTES EXTERNAL ASPECTS CLOSE QUOTES. SEE 2 IFTS.

DETAIL

2. FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TWO GERMANY'S, FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM MET IN BONN TODAY FOR THE FIRST MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION AT 2+4, TO DISCUSS THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OTTAWA MANDATE. DETAILED RECORDS OF DISCUSSION FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TELEGRAMS.

3. THE SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA FOR THE 2+4 PROCESS WAS AGREED. IT CONSISTS OF FOUR ITEMS: BORDERS, POLITICO/MILITARY ISSUES BEARING IN MIND APPROACHES FOR SUITABLE SECURITY STRUCTURES IN EUROPE, BERLIN, AND FINAL SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERMINATION OF THE FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THE MINISTERIAL SERIES WILL CONTINUE WITH THE NEXT MEETING IN EAST BERLIN IN JUNE, FOLLOWED BY PARIS IN JULY (TO WHICH POLAND WILL BE INVITED) AND MOSCOW IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. AT THIS RHYTHM, THE UK WOULD CHAIR THE FINAL MEETING OF THE FIRST ROUND OF MINISTERIALS IN LONDON AROUND NOVEMBER. TO PREPARE THESE MINISTERIALS, POLITICAL DIRECTORS WERE INSTRUCTED TO INTENSIFY THE FREQUENCY OF THEIR OWN MEETINGS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

4. IN SUBSTANCE THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS SHOWED WHAT I CALLED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE AFTERWARDS OPEN QUOTES A SERIOUS AND CONCILIATORY APPROACH CLOSE QUOTES ON ALL SIDES. THERE WAS

AGREEMENT THAT THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNITY SHOULD BE ACHIEVED IN AN ORDERLY WAY AND WITHOUT DELAY: THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE TERMINATED BY MEANS OF AN APPROPRIATE SETTLEMENT: AND THAT AN EXPANDED AND INTENSIFIED CSCE PROCESS HAD AN IMPORTANT PART TO PLAY IN THE WIDER CONTEXT.

5. THE MAIN INTEREST IN THE DAY'S PROCEEDINGS LAY IN SHEVARDNADZE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MORNING'S FIRST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE. THIS REVEALED THE SOVIET PREOCCUPATION THAT EVEN THOUGH THEY RECOGNISE THAT GERMAN STATE UNITY WOULD OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE, (NO EXPRESSED WORRIES ABOUT ARTICLE 23), THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS SHOULD NOT BE CONCLUDED IN THE SAME RAPID TIME-FRAME: AND THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE TERMINATED UNTIL AFTER A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (POSSIBLY OF SOME YEARS) DURING WHICH A PACKAGE OF POTENTIAL CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES HAD BEEN SEWN UP IN THE FINAL SETTLEMENT (INCLUDING BORDERS, MILITARY FORCES, THE MILITARY STATUS OF GERMANY ETC). THIS APPROACH OF COURSE IMPLIES A CONTINUING LIMITATION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A UNITED GERMANY BY THE PERPETUATION OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS. TO UNDERPIN THIS THESIS SHEVARDNADZE ADVANCED THE NOTION OF THE 2+4 AS A KIND OF COORDINATING GROUP TO ENSURE THAT THE RESOLUTION OF EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNITY WENT HAND IN HAND WITH PROGRESS ON WIDER EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES, ARMS CONTROL, CSBMS, CSCE ETC. THE RATHER STILTED ADDITION TO THE SECOND AGENDA ITEM IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE REFLECTS ATTEMPTS TO GIVE SHEVARDNADZE SOME MINOR RECOGNITION ON THIS OPEN QUOTES SYNCHRONISATION CLOSE QUOTES CONCERN, WITHOUT CONCEDED ANYTHING OF PRINCIPLE FROM THE WESTERN ANGLE.

6. THE SOVIET RESERVATIONS ON A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO ALSO CAME THROUGH CLEARLY BUT WITHOUT RANCOUR. SHEVARDNADZE ASSERTED THAT SOVIET POLITICAL OPINION WAS IRRECONCILABLY OPPOSED AND SPOKE OF CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS. BUT HE ALSO SHOWED THAT HE WAS ALIVE TO THE FACT THAT NATO ITSELF WAS ADJUSTING AND MOVING WITH THE TIMES, AND HIS PRESENTATION SEEMED TO LEAVE OPEN A NUMBER OF CONCEPTUAL ESCAPE ROUTES.

7. ALL IN ALL, A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL AND BUSINESSLIKE OCCASION, SO FAR AS IT WENT. BUT THE UNDERLYING SOVIET APPROACH IS AT ODDS WITH THAT OF THE OTHER FIVE ON HOW MUCH LIES WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE 2+4 AS SUCH. THEIR WISH TO SPIN OUT THE PROCESS IS DESIGNED TO MINIMISE THE EXTENT TO WHICH GERMAN UNITY CAN BE SEEN WHETHER AT HOME OR ABROAD AS A DIPLOMATIC DEFEAT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY HOLD FEW WINNING CARDS. THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOME HARD SLOGGING AHEAD BEFORE WE CAN BE SURE THAT IN SECRETARY BAKER'S

WORDS IT HAS BEEN A GAME FROM WHICH ONLY WINNERS (AND NO LOSERS)
EMERGE AT THE END OF THE DAY.

8. SEE 2 IFTS.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

181

MAIN

161

.BERLIN/INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS
.(WIDE)
LIMITED
WED
SOVIET D
KIEV UNIT
EED
JAU/EED
ACDD
ECD(E)
MAED
ECD (I)
SECPOL D
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
NEWS D
INFO D
NAD
PLANNERS
RAD
RMD

CRD
ECONOMIC ADVISERS
LEGAL ADVISERS
CLAIMS D
PS
PS/MR MAUDE
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR MCLAREN
MR TOMKYS
MR BAYNE
MR BROOMFIELD
MR GREENSTOCK
MR GOULDEN
MISS SPENCER
MR LING
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR BEAMISH
MR KERR
MR TAIT

ADDITIONAL 20

BERLIN/INNER-GERMAN (WIDE)

PS/NO 10.

NNNN