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TELNO 588

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BM BERLIN FOR THE AMBASSADOR

MY TELNO 586: GERMAN UNIFICATION: FOLLOW UP TO TWO PLUS FOUR MEETING

SUMMARY

1. KOHL COMES OUT SQUARELY AGAINST SHEVARDNADZE'S DECOUPLING PROPOSAL, STRESSING HIS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE AIM OF SETTLING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNITY AT THE SAME TIME. TELTSCHIK SEES PROSPECT OF STATE UNITY THIS YEAR.

DETAIL

2. KOHL TOLD A MEETING OF THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ON THE AFTERNOON OF 8 MAY THAT HE REGARDED THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL AS AN UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT. IT DID NOT CORRESPOND TO HIS IDEAS. HE HELD TO THE VIEW THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE TIME OF THE CSCE SUMMIT.

3. I DISCUSSED THE POSITION EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON WITH TELTSCHIK OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY. HE SAID THAT KOHL STILL WANTED ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE LIFTED AROUND THE TIME OF STATE UNITY. GENSCHER WAS TEMPTED BY THE IDEA OF AGREEING THAT SOME ALLIED RIGHTS MIGHT LAST UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF CFE TWO. BUT KOHL WAS AGAINST THIS, SINCE IT WOULD ENABLE THE RUSSIANS TO STRING OUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS MUCH AS THEY WANTED. IF THERE WAS A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THE DATE OF ITS CONCLUSION MUST BE FIXED IN ADVANCE. I TRIED ON TELTSCHIK THE VIEW IN MY TELELETTER OF 7 MAY TO WESTON THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE TRYING TO RETAIN SUPREME AUTHORITY IN GERMANY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESERVATION OF SOME, NOT ALL, ALLIED RIGHTS, IN PARTICULAR THE RIGHT TO HAVE STATIONED FORCES AND MILITARY MISSIONS IN GERMANY AND PERHAPS SOME RIGHTS CONCERNING AVIATION. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY. A CDU CHANCELLOR COULD NOT ASK THE GERMAN PUBLIC TO ACCEPT LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY AFTER UNITY, ESPECIALLY WHEN

THE WESTERN ALLIES HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR RIGHTS AROUND THE TIME OF UNITY.

4. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT A CRISIS CENTRE OF FIVE COUNTRIES, AS PROPOSED BY SHEVARDNADZE, WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO KOHL BECAUSE IT WOULD PERPETUATE A SPECIAL SOVIET SAY IN GERMAN AFFAIRS. IT WOULD ALSO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER CSCE COUNTRIES. ANY NEW CSCE BODY FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT SHOULD CONSIST OF ALL THIRTY-FIVE COUNTRIES.

5. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT KOHL REMAINED AS FIRM AS EVER ON GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. GERMANY MUST BE FREE AFTER ANY TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TO ENSURE ITS SECURITY AS A MEMBER OF NATO IN WHATEVER WAY IT AND THE ALLIANCE DECIDED. IN A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO TOLERATE SOME LACK OF CLARITY, BUT EVEN HERE IT WAS TOO RISKY TO ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO ASSERT THAT THE OLD GDR WAS STILL IN THE WARSAW PACT, WITHOUT OUR CONTRADICTING THIS VIEW.

6. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE WEST MUST NOT MAKE EARLY CONCESSIONS TO THE RUSSIANS ON THESE MATTERS. THE SOVIET POSITION MIGHT BE INFLUENCED BY A GENEROUS GERMAN ATTITUDE TO ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE GERMANS AND RUSSIANS WERE ALSO DISCUSSING, TELTSCHIK SAID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION BETWEEN THEM ABOUT FUTURE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE INFLUENCED, TOO, IF THE WEST WAS FORTHCOMING ABOUT NEW STRUCTURES IN CSCE AND ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF FURTHER TROOP REDUCTIONS IN CFE TWO. ON THE LATTER, TELTSCHIK SAID IN CONFIDENCE THAT GERMANY MIGHT BE WILLING, PROVIDED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES DID LIKEWISE, TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THIS YEAR AN UPPER LIMIT FOR THE BUNDESWEHR TO BE WORKED OUT IN DETAIL IN CFE TWO.

4 7. ON THE TIMING OF PROGRESS TOWARDS GERMAN UNITY, TELTSCHIK SAID THAT PARADOXICALLY SHEVARDNADZE'S DECOUPLING OF INTERNAL FROM EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WAS LIKELY TO ACCELERATE THE INTERNAL PROCESS. THE LAENDER MIGHT BE RECREATED IN THE GDR IN THE COMING WEEKS. GEMU WOULD TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED ON 2 JULY. A GDR MOVE FOR ACCESSION TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC UNDER ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW MIGHT NOW COME AS EARLY AS AUTUMN 1990. ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS COULD THEN TAKE PLACE, INSTEAD OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS, IN DECEMBER 1990. I SPOKE TODAY TO A GROUP OF SENIOR FDP PARLIAMENTARIANS, WHO WERE ALSO ADVOCATING ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS NEXT WINTER. I ASKED TELTSCHIK WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS WERE SET FOR DECEMBER, AND TWO PLUS FOUR RAN INTO DIFFICULTY IN THE AUTUMN. HE SAID THAT HE SUPPOSED THAT AGREEMENT IN TWO PLUS FOUR WOULD THEN HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER GERMAN STATE UNITY. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT

IT WOULD BE MOST INAUSPICIOUS FOR GERMAN UNITY TO COME ABOUT WITHOUT
THE POSITIVE GOODWILL OF THE OTHER STATES MOST CLOSELY INTERESTED.

COMMENT

8. THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION AS YET FROM THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT TO KOHL'S REJECTION OF SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSAL. GENSCHER'S LINE TILL NOW HAS BEEN MARKEDLY LESS NEGATIVE, AS DESCRIBED IN MY TUR. HE HAS SOME WAY TO GO IF HE IS TO ACCEPT THE FRESH LEAD THAT KOHL HAS NOW GIVEN.

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PAGE 3

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