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MIPT: GERMAN UNIFICATION: TWO PLUS FOUR: FINAL SETTLEMENT

SUMMARY

1. FRANCE PROPOSES OUTLINE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT COVERING BORDERS, BERLIN AND TERMINATION OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. SOVIET UNION FAVOURS ONE LEGAL DOCUMENT. ACCEPTS FRENCH OUTLINE BUT ALSO WANTS POL-MIL ISSUES COVERED IN SETTLEMENT. CONTINUES TO ARGUE AGAINST GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. SHEVARDNADZE TO CIRCULATE NEW IDEAS ON CSCE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. WEST ARGUES THAT POL-MIL ISSUES ARE FOR SOLUTION IN FORA OTHER THAN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.

DETAIL

2. AS AGREED AT THE PRECEDING MEETING OF THE WESTERN FOUR DUFORCQ (FRANCE) DESCRIBED THE POSSIBLE SHAPE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT. IT SHOULD INCLUDE A GENERAL POLITICAL PREAMBLE AND A NUMBER OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS COVERING: THE REALIZATION OF THE UNIFICATION OF THE FRG, GDR AND BERLIN AND AN END TO THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE BORDERS OF GERMANY: THE TERMINATION OF THE EXISTING STATUS OF BERLIN: AN AFFIRMATION OF THE FULL SOVEREIGNTY OF A UNITED GERMANY AND THE TERMINATION OF QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. IN THE FINAL SETTLEMENT THE FOUR SHOULD ALSO TAKE NOTE OF CERTAIN POLITICAL OR LEGAL ACTIONS INCLUDING A GERMAN/POLISH TREATY ON THE POLISH WESTERN BORDER AND THE REVISION OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION (TO REMOVE ARTICLE 23 ETC). WESTON AND KASTRUP (FRG) WELCOMED THIS OUTLINE AS A BASIS FOR WORK.

3. MISSELWITZ (GDR) ALSO WELCOMED THE OUTLINE, BUT ADDED THAT WE WOULD NEED TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE MILITARY STATUS OF A UNITED GERMANY AND ABOUT STATIONED FORCES IN GERMANY. A SETTLEMENT MIGHT ALSO REFER TO UNILATERAL STATEMENTS BY GERMANY ON THE RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND GUARANTEEING THE PEACE ORIENTED POLICY OF THE NEW STATE.

4. BONDARENKO (USSR) SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD FAVOUR A SINGLE

DOCUMENT. IT SHOULD INCLUDE THE ELEMENTS OUTLINED BY DUFOURCQ, BUT MUST ALSO COVER THE POL-MIL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION INCLUDING THE POL-MIL STATUS OF A UNIFIED GERMANY, THE SIZE OF GERMAN ARMED FORCES, THE TEMPORARY CONTINUATION OF STATIONED FORCES IN GERMANY ETC. IT WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE EXISTING BALANCE IN EUROPE BE MAINTAINED. GERMANY SHOULD VOLUNTARILY UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM USING ITS MILITARY OR HUMAN POTENTIAL ON BEHALF OF ANY ALLIANCE. GERMANY WOULD NOT BE NEUTRAL OR SINGULARIZED BECAUSE WE WOULD ESTABLISH NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES FOR EUROPE TO REPLACE ALLIANCES. ITS SPECIAL POL-MIL STATUS WOULD FALL AWAY ONCE THESE NEW STRUCTURES WERE IN PLACE.

5. ZOELICK (US) SUPPORTED THE FRENCH OUTLINE. OUR AIM WAS TO RETURN FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO GERMANY. SHE SHOULD NOT BE SINGULARIZED. POL-MIL ISSUES WERE FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY TO DECIDE, OR TO BE DECIDED IN FORA OTHER THAN THE TWO PLUS FOUR. GERMANY HAD THE RIGHT UNDER PRINCIPLE ONE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO BELONG TO AN ALLIANCE. BONDARENKO REPLIED THAT PRINCIPLE TEN OF THE FINAL ACT COMMITTED US TO IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR COMMITMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THESE INCLUDED THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT, IN WHICH THE FOUR POWERS HAD UNDERTAKEN CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS. ALL STATES HAD CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. NO ONE COULD CONVINCE THE SOVIET PUBLIC THAT THE GDR LEAVING THE WARSAW PACT AND JOINING NATO WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET UNION DESERVED THE RIGHT TO FEEL CONFIDENT IN ITS SECURITY.

6. KASTRUP SAID WE SHOULD LEAVE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE SHOULD BE ONE DOCUMENT TO ONE SIDE FOR THE MOMENT, ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ON THIS POINT. THE AGREEMENT MIGHT REFER TO GERMAN RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND TO THE NEED FOR PEACE RATHER THAN WAR TO SPRING FROM GERMAN SOIL IN FUTURE. BUT THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON GERMAN SOIL WAS A DECISION FOR A SOVEREIGN GERMAN GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIET UNION A RESTRICTED STATIONING OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. BUT THIS WAS NOT FOR SETTLEMENT IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR. ON NATO, GERMANY WAS READY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER HAD SAID THE NATO STRUCTURE WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED INTO THE GDR. NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS A MATTER FOR A SOVEREIGN GERMANY TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF, AND FOR DISCUSSION IN THE ALLIANCE.

7. BONDARENKO SAID HE DID NOT DISPUTE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A

UNIFIED GERMANY. BUT IF GERMANY COULD ACCEPT TREATIES ON SOME ISSUES, WHY NOT ON OTHERS? UNILATERAL STATEMENTS WERE NOT ENOUGH. THE WEST SHOULD NOT PAINT THE SOVIET UNION INTO A CORNER. THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE CSCE WAS IMPORTANT. SHEVARDNADZE WOULD CIRCULATE DETAILED IDEAS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE TO THE 34 OTHER MINISTERS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

8. MISSELWITZ SAID UNIFICATION SHOULD NOT COME ABOUT IN BREACH OF TREATIES. A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD OFFER THE SOVIET UNION ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A THREAT. THE GDR MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE WARSAW PACT WITHOUT ENDANGERING SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS. THE GDR WOULD NOT BE INTEGRATED INTO NATO, AND WAS READY TO INTRODUCE A BINDING ELEMENT INTO THIS COMMITMENT.

9. SUMMING UP CURSORILY, DUFOURCQ SAID HIS OUTLINE APPEARED ACCEPTABLE TO ALL: BUT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO ADD POL-MIL ISSUES. WE DIFFERED OVER WHETHER THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE DECIDED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR OR IN OTHER FORA. BONDARENKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED A PACKAGE APPROACH: ONE DOCUMENT DEALING WITH ALL THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION.

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