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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 358

OF 231350Z MAY 90

AND TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PARIS, EAST BERLIN, BM BERLIN

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WARSAW, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, TOKYO

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GERMAN UNIFICATION: MEETING OF THE WESTERN FOUR, BONN, 22 MAY

SUMMARY

1. DIFFERENCES OVER THE SEQUENCE OF UNIFICATION, SETTLEMENT AND RENUNCIATION OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. US EMPHASISES AIM OF COMPLETING WORK BY CSCE SUMMIT. AGREEMENT ON MEETING OF EXPERT GROUPS ON LEGAL ASPECTS AND BERLIN. FRENCH TO BRIEF THE NAC.

DETAIL

2. POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE UK, US, FRANCE AND THE FRG MET IN BONN ON 22 MAY TO PREPARE FOR THE OFFICIAL LEVEL TWO PLUS FOUR. FRANCE WAS IN THE CHAIR. (THE UK DELEGATION ARRIVED LATE BECAUSE OF FLIGHT DELAYS AND WERE REPRESENTED FOR MUCH OF THE TIME BY MINISTER (BONN).) MIFT REPORTS US BRIEFING ON DISCUSSION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION IN MOSCOW.

3. KASTRUP (FRG) SAID GENSCHER ENVISAGED THE FOLLOWING: PRIOR TO THE CSCE SUMMIT, CONCLUSION OF A PROTOCOL AT SIX. THIS WOULD PROVIDE CLARITY ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS, VIZ UNIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 23, ALL GERMAN ELECTIONS, A NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT, TERMINATION OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, A GERMAN/POLISH TREATY AND A FINAL SETTLEMENT. DUFOURCQ (FRANCE) SAID THEY ENVISAGED UNIFICATION AND THE FORMATION OF AN ALL GERMAN GOVERNMENT BEFORE A SETTLEMENT WAS SIGNED. ZOELICK (US) EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO OPEN UP A GAP BETWEEN UNIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS. THE US WOULD PREFER UNIFICATION, SETTLEMENT AND DISSOLUTION OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS TO HAPPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS COULD BE DONE IF THE FOUR TOOK ACTION TO DISSOLVE QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONTINGENT ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT BY A UNITED GERMANY OF CERTAIN ACTS THAT WOULD ENABLE A SETTLEMENT TO BE PUT IN PLACE. DUFOURCQ OBJECTED THAT THIS WOULD RAISE ALL SORTS OF PROBLEMS. HOW COULD WE ENSURE THAT A UNITED GERMANY REALLY DID SIGN A TREATY WITH POLAND? ZOELICK UNDERTOOK TO

CIRCULATE A PAPER ON THE SEQUENCE.

4. ZOELLICK SAID WE MUST AIM TO COMPLETE WORK IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR BY THE TIME OF THE CSCE SUMMIT, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO AGREE ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. IT WAS AGREED THAT LEGAL EXPERTS OF THE WESTERN FOUR SHOULD MEET AGAIN IN PARIS ON 31 MAY. THEIR MAIN AIM WOULD BE TO FLESH OUT THE FRENCH PAPER BY BEGINNING TO PUT THE KEY ELEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT IN JURIDICAL FORM, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT ALSO DISCUSS SOME OTHER ISSUES. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE BERLIN EXPERT GROUP SHOULD MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE SENAT.

6. IT WAS AGREED THAT DUFOURCQ WOULD BRIEF THE NAC ON THE TWO PLUS FOUR ON 23 MAY.

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MIPT: GERMAN UNIFICATION: MEETING OF THE WESTERN FOUR: US/USSR

SUMMARY

1. REPORT ON BAKER'S DISCUSSIONS ON GERMANY IN MOSCOW. GORBACHEV TAKES A TOUGH LINE ON GERMANY AND NATO. SUGGESTS SOVIET UNION MAY WANT TO JOIN NATO. KVITSINSKY INSISTS AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED IN TWO PLUS FOUR BEFORE ALL-GERMAN GOVERNMENT FORMED. AGREEMENT ON NEED NOT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO RUSSIANS AT THIS STAGE.

DETAIL

2. ZOELICK REPORTED ON BAKER'S DISCUSSION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION WITH GORBACHEV, SHEVARDNADZE AND KVITSINSKY IN MOSCOW.

3. BAKER HAD OUTLINED NINE AREAS WHERE THE WEST WAS READY TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ON GERMANY:

A) WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO A FOLLOW ON TO CFE I WHICH SHOULD ADDRESS THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN A CENTRAL REGION.

B) NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF SHOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD.

C) A GERMAN ASSURANCE ON NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

D) NO NATO FORCES WOULD BE STATIONED IN THE GDR FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

E) SOVIET FORCES COULD REMAIN IN THE GDR FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

F) THERE WOULD BE A REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY.

G) THE QUESTION OF GERMAN BORDERS WOULD BE SETTLED.

H) CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE CSCE AND ENSURING A SIGNIFICANT ROLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE.

I) THE SATISFACTORY HANDLING OF ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION.

4. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN TOUGH ON GERMANY AND NATO. A CHANGE IN THE EXISTING BALANCE WOULD THREATEN STABILITY. IF GERMANY WENT AHEAD AND BECAME A MEMBER OF NATO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WALKING OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND RETHINKING ITS MILITARY

DOCTRINE. THE WEST SHOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS TIME. IF WE TRUSTED GERMANY WHY DID IT NEED TO BE A MEMBER OF NATO? WHAT IF GERMANY LEFT NATO AND BECAME NON ALIGNED LIKE FRANCE (SIC)? PERHAPS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ASK TO JOIN NATO ITSELF (BAKER BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS). GORBACHEV EMPHASISED THE CONNECTION BETWEEN GERMAN UNIFICATION AND BUILDING UP THE CSCE.

5. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THE WEST MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOVIET INTERESTS. THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD DECIDE HOW THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD BE LIMITED IN CFE I.

6. KVITSINSKY HAD INSISTED THAT AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR BEFORE A UNIFIED GERMAN PARLIAMENT AND A UNIFIED GOVERNMENT TOOK OFFICE. WE COULD THEN DECIDE WHEN TO TERMINATE FOUR POWER RIGHTS. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR A LONG DELAY. IN CONTRAST TO SHEVARDNADZE, HE SAID THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD AGREE A CEILING FOR THE BUNDESWEHR TO BE INSERTED INTO CFE 2.

7. THE AMERICANS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO ACCELERATE ECONOMIC REFORM AND WERE ANXIOUS TO SECURE ACCESS TO WESTERN CAPITAL MARKETS. THEY HAD REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO A SUM OF DOLLARS 20 BILLION BEING NEEDED WHILE PRICE REFORM TOOK PLACE.

8. ZOELLICK SAID HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE DIGGING IN ON HARDLINE POSITIONS. WE SHOULD ENGAGE THEM IN NEGOTIATION BUT NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS AT THIS STAGE. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO A CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTRE IN THE CSCE, BUT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE WAY ON THIS - NOR ECONOMIC ISSUES - TOO SOON. IN PARTICULAR THE FRG SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT PROVIDING THE FINANCIAL MEANS FOR THE RUSSIANS TO PROLONG THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GDR.

9. WESTON SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO CLEAR OUR MINDS ABOUT HOW FAR, AT THE END OF THE DAY, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WESTERN THREE ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT TO LAY ASIDE A LARGE PART OF THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IF DESPITE IMMINENT GERMAN UNITY ON WHOLLY SATISFACTORY TERMS THE RUSSIANS REMAINED OBDURATE IN SEEKING TO PERPETUATE LIMITATIONS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY.

ZOELLICK SAID THE US HAD ALSO BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER WE COULD AT THE END OF THE DAY GO AHEAD WITHOUT THE RUSSIANS. BUT WESTON EMPHASISED AND ALL AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY MUCH A SECOND BEST OUTCOME. THE AIM MUST REMAIN TO BRING THE RUSSIANS TO AN AGREEMENT ON EXTERNAL ASPECTS IN PARALLEL TO THE APPROACH TO GERMAN UNITY, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

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