



10 DOWNING STREET

R. Hunter

Some over-night
material.

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TELEGRAM

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BURNING BUSH

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OF

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOUR POWER MEETING OF BERLIN FOREIGN MINISTERS,

TURNBERRY: 6 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. Baker and Genscher give upbeat accounts of latest contacts with Shevardnadze. Believe Russian attitude to German membership of NATO constantly shifting - and softening. General willingness to contemplate a Warsaw Pact/NATO declaration but ball in Russian court.

Procedural agreement among the Four on way forward over Polish border treaty. On Middle East, Baker insists on need for Arafat to condemn Abu Abbas raid if PLO dialogue to continue. Offers meeting with EC Twelve on Middle East.

DETAIL

2. The Four Foreign Ministers met for over 2 hours at Turnberry today.

2+4 ISSUES

3. Baker said the Americans had been rather surprised by Gorbachev's willingness to agree to Helsinki language on alliances. Since then, the Russians had back-pedalled a bit with Shevardnadze saying that Helsinki could not override Potsdam. President Bush would have a hard time because of his willingness to sign a commercial agreement

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with the Soviet Union. This was a very politically sensitive matter in the United States. The Russians had come to Washington knowing that they might leave without an agreement. They had been very candid in saying how painful it would be for them to go home without an agreement - particularly after the renewal of China's MFN status. The Russians knew that, unless their emigration law was passed, the agreement would not be put to Congress and that Congress would not approve it unless the Lithuanian situation improved.

4. Baker had discussed a possible NATO/Warsaw Pact declaration or agreement with Shevardnadze in Copenhagen on 5 June. He had urged Shevardnadze to be specific on what the Russians wanted. Shevardnadze had suggested a working group. Baker had turned this down. Shevardnadze had said he would have proposals in 7-10 days.

Shevardnadze had said that any transitional period in which Four Power rights and responsibilities would continue should not exceed the time it would take to bring about political and economic unification, provided there was some understanding on limits on German forces (Baker was not sure whether Shevardnadze had said German forces or the Bundeswehr). This was a significant change in the Russian approach but not as significant as it had first appeared. The Russians thought that unification would take longer than the Germans estimated.

Shevardnadze had made clear that he wanted an improvement in German/Soviet relations even if a united Germany was in NATO. Agreement on German force levels was evidently the key in his mind. This would have to be dealt with as part of the external aspects of unification. It was not clear how the Russians were linking this to CFE. The main point for them was agreement on force levels in the

overall context of agreement on the external aspects of unification. The Russians had also agreed on the desirability of reaching a CFE agreement this year and as a pre-condition to the CSCE Summit.

5. Genscher said he had had an hour's meeting with Shevardnadze before Baker's meeting in Copenhagen. Shevardnadze had been enthusiastic about the Washington Summit. Genscher's impression was that there was a whole new quality to US/Soviet relations and warm personal relations had been established at the top level.

Shevardnadze had raised with him the issue of relations between the two alliances. The Russians wanted to show their public opinion that relations had been transformed. Shevardnadze's invitation to him to go to the grave of his brother in Brest was also designed to demonstrate the qualitative change in relations. Shevardnadze had said that the millions who had suffered and survived in World War 2 would see the visit as a symbol of the change.

Shevardnadze had asked for a unilateral FRG statement on limits on the size of the Bundeswehr. Genscher had said this was a matter for Vienna. Germany did not want singularisation. Shevardnadze had been unclear as to whether he wanted this clarification as part of the first Vienna agreement. Nor had he been specific about troops in the central zone.

6. Timing of unification. Genscher said there was still some disagreement within the GDR. The liberals wanted unification sooner than the social democrats. Genscher rehearsed the arguments in favour of a short gap between GEMU and unification - on the lines he had used with the Secretary of State in Oxfordshire 10 days ago. But he was even more concerned than then about the resurgence of the old Communist bureaucracy in the GDR.

7. Genscher said elections would have to take place by 13 January 1991. The German government would prefer elections in December, if possible. Dumas was proposing a CSCE Summit on 19-21 December but Genscher would prefer the Summit in November with the results of the 2+4 going to the Summit. If the CSCE Summit was in December, elections could not be held two weeks later. One of the reasons the Russians were shifting their position on the CFE was because they were anxious to have the CSCE Summit and to have their ideas discussed there. They wanted to show their public opinion that relations between the two alliances had changed. If the Warsaw Pact could be presented in a new light, the Hungarians and others might stay in - or so the Russians hoped.
8. The Secretary of State said it was right to put the ball in the Soviet court on NATO/Warsaw Pact relations. A pact-to-pact agreement would help the Soviet Union keep the Warsaw Pact alive. Was that what we wanted? A simple declaration might be better than an agreement involving ongoing procedures which would reaffirm the Pact and duplicate work in CSCE. Baker agreed. It was better to go for a once and for all statement. The US wanted to strengthen NATO. On the other hand, the threat to the Alliance's continuation might be less significant from a weakened Warsaw Pact than from new structures within the CSCE. We could find it harder to argue that the Alliance was necessary if strengthening the CSCE were the centre of discussion.
9. Dumas had doubts about an agreement with the Warsaw Pact. Hungary and Poland wanted out of the Pact, though the Hungarians were prepared to move slowly. The Secretary of State wondered whether it would be better to go for a USSR/NATO declaration rather than a NATO/Warsaw

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Pact declaration. Baker said it was all a matter of saving Russian face. They needed to explain to their people that 27 million dead and 18 million wounded in World War 2 had not been in vain. Dumas remained dubious about reinforcing the Pact. Genscher thought a declaration a possibility. We should anyway explain to the Russians that German membership of NATO should not matter to them because NATO had a new political character. We should take stock in Turnberry at the end of the Warsaw pact meeting on 7 June.

10. Summing up, the Secretary of State said that it had been right to put the ball in the Soviet court. We should think about our own response, with a view to a declaration rather than a procedure. We should also consider whether we were going for a NATO/Warsaw pact declaration or for a procedure between NATO and the Soviet Union alone. Dumas agreed with the NATO/USSR approach but Genscher did not. Baker said we should await the next move from the Russians.

11. Reverting to the timing of German unification, Genscher said that there would be a Party Convention between the FRG and the GDR Liberals on 30 September, at which the two parties would merge. The two Christian Democrat parties would meet on 1 October and would also merge. Thereafter they would have one Chairman (Kohl) and only one deputy Chairman (de Maziere) instead of six deputy Chairmen now. De Maziere's agreement to this was an indication that he was going forward with unification. Article 23 of the German Constitution would be formally activated once GEMU had been ratified.

22 JUNE 2+4 MEETING

12. The Secretary of State opened discussion of the Polish border issue, referring to the paper entitled

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"Principles for discussion under Agenda item 1" which had been discussed by Political Directors. This paper deliberately kept alive a certain ambiguity on the Polish question. In Copenhagen, Skubiszewski had said that he was no longer asking for a draft treaty to be initialled but Mazowiecki did consider it necessary to have a draft treaty discussed before unification. The Secretary of State had tried to persuade him that what was on offer was sufficient but he had remained unhappy.

13. Genscher said the two German parliaments would adopt their declarations on the border on 21 June. He thought he had persuaded Skubiszewski that he was not playing games and hoped to be able to persuade him that the declarations of the two parliaments conveyed by the two governments would be enough. He did not think Kohl could accept discussion of the treaty before unification.

Dumas argued the Polish case. Genscher cautioned against discussion of the draft treaty before unification. If agreement was not reached in that discussion, then the world would think that there was active disagreement, which could become dangerous.. Besides, the Poles were raising a number of difficult issues in their own draft treaty, eg the exclusion of Article 116 of the German Constitution which governed the position of Germans outside Germany and could not be changed.

14. In discussion of the paper prepared by Political Directors, it was agreed that it would be put to the Russians via discussion by Ministers in the 2+4 on 22 June and then put to the Poles. Dumas wanted the text strengthened to make it clear that the declarations by the two German governments on the finality of the borders of a united Germany represented a formal commitment. Genscher said he could agree to that. He would not be

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able to agree to anything which suggested that the Four Occupying Powers were guaranteeing the borders of a united Germany.

15. Discussion then turned to the document prepared by Political Directors on elements of a final settlement. Dumas wanted the document to include reference to a declaration confirming that the German government renounced the manufacture of A, B and C grade weapons. It was eventually agreed that, for tactical reasons, such language should not be included at this stage but could in due course be offered to the Russians as a way of getting them to accept the rest of the paper.

16. Sequencing. There was an inconclusive discussion of the sequence of events on unification, ratification of a German/Polish border treaty and final settlement. It was agreed that further work was needed on this (a compromise UK formulation circulated afterwards attracted favourable comment from the French and Germans). Genscher said that agreement would have to be reached with the GDR on a legal procedure. That could not be done until after the ratification of GEMU. Thereafter he would come back with proposals.

MIDDLE EAST

17. Baker urged that focus be kept on the Israeli refusal to come to the peace table. He spoke as he had done previously with the Secretary of State (separate telegram). The Secretary of State described his visit to the Middle East. Baker said that, if the US/PLO dialogue was to continue, it was essential for Arafat to condemn the Tel Aviv raid and probably necessary for him to say that Abu Abbas would not remain a member of the PNC Executive Committee. Dumas, who agreed with the Secretary of State that the situation in the region was

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serious, thought that Arafat had made such a declaration. The Secretary of State commented that removing Abu Abbas might be beyond Arafat's power. Baker agreed but Arafat must at least make the effort. Baker said he would be very happy to come over for a discussion with the Twelve on the Middle East. Dumas said we were living in dangerous times. Arafat's position was getting weaker and weaker. The Twelve might have to see what they could do. Baker implied that the Twelve should feel free to do so but he was evidently sceptical that the Twelve could achieve movement where the US could not.