

CONFIDENTIAL

106746
MDLIAN 2765

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 800

OF 291454Z JUNE 90

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO,

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA

SIC

PART 1 OF 2 PARTS

MODUK FOR AUS(POL), DACU AND SEC(NATO/UK)(P)

UK-FRG POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS : BONN, 27 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. USEFUL PREPARATION FOR NATO SUMMIT. GERMANS DO NOT ACCEPT THAT CHANGE IN NATO STRATEGY SHOULD WAIT FOR CFE IMPLEMENTATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE. AGREEMENT ON NEED TO INVOLVE US IN MULTINATIONAL FORCES. FULL DISCUSSION OF IDEAS FOR CSCE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: GERMANS MAY WELL ACCEPT ONE RATHER THAN TWO. CENTERS INDICATION THAT SOVIET UNION MAY SEEK TO LIMIT GERMAN EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS MANPOWER IN 2 PLUS 4. INITIAL DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS: GERMAN PREFERENCE FOR PARTICIPATION BY ALL STATES WITH COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS, AND TO EXCLUDE AIR-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS. UK EMPHASISED IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING A CREDIBLE THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. SOME POL-MIL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION DISCUSSED BREIFLY OVER LUNCH.

DETAIL

NATO SUMMIT

2. HOFSTETTER (DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR) RECALLED THAT SUDHOFF (PUS-EQUIVALENT) HAD TOLD SIR P CRADOCK THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE FORWARD - LOOKING AND NOT SIMPLY REPEAT OLD PROFESSIONS OF FAITH. THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE CLEAR IT WOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT THIS COMMUNIQUE, NOT LEAST IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMAN UNIFICATION, TO SEE WHETHER NATO HAD CHANGED. THE SUMMIT SHOULD STATE THAT THE MEMBERS OF NATO WERE READY TO MAKE A JOINT DECLARATION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT.

3. GOULDEN SAID THE UK FAVOURED SUCH A DECLARATION, PROVIDED THE EAST EUROPEANS HAD NO OBJECTION (OUR EMBASSIES WERE TAKING SOUNDINGS) AND IT DID NOT INHIBIT WHAT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR OUR

SECURITY. IT SHOULD BE OPEN FOR SIGNATURE BY ALL OF THE 35. WE DID NOT SHARE THE US CONCERN THAT ALLIANCE COHESION MIGHT NOT WITHSTAND THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING SUCH A DECLARATION. HOFSTETTER SAID THAT THE HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER HAD RECENTLY TOLD KOHL HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO SUCH A DECLARATION: ANTALL CLEARLY SAW IT AS NO OBSTACLE TO TAKING HUNGARY OUT OF THE WARSAW PACT. HOFSTETTER SUGGESTED THE DECLARATION BE NEGOTIATED BY THE 23 IN VIENNA (NOT NECESSARILY BY EXISTING DELEGATIONS) IN TIME FOR SIGNATURE TOGETHER WITH CFE. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE CONTENTS OF THE DECLARATION SHOWED MUCH COMMON GROUND. WE ALSO FLOATED THE IDEA OF INVITING THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS TO VISIT THE NAC AFTER MINISTERIAL MEETINGS.

NATO STRATEGY REVIEW

4. GOULDEN SAID OUR TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO INVOLVE FRANCE (HOFSTETTER AGREED) AND TO HAVE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR GUIDELINES FROM THE SUMMIT. THE REVIEW SHOULD PRODUCE RESULTS REASONABLY QUICKLY BUT WITHOUT A DEADLINE. (HOFSTETTER AGREED: IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO HASTY.) OUR PLANNING ASSUMPTION SHOULD BE THAT CHANGES IN STRATEGY WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF CFE 1 AND SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE (RATHER THAN FROM THE GDR). THE GERMANS TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS. HOFSTETTER, WITH SUPPORT FROM COL MARTENS (FMOD) ARGUED THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION HAD ALREADY CHANGED ENOUGH TO WARRANT SOME CHANGES IN OUR STRATEGY NOW. GOULDEN ARGUED THAT THE CHANGES SO FAR WERE STILL REVERSIBLE.

5. HOFSTETTER SAID NATO SHOULD OFFER PRIZES FOR NEW TERMINOLOGY TO REPLACE 'FORWARD DEFENCE', 'FLEXIBLE RESPONSE' AND 'DETERRENCE', BUT HAD NO FIRM PROPOSALS TO OFFER. HE COMMENDED STOLTENBERG'S RECENT SPEECH TO BUNDESWEHR COMMANDERS, WHICH REAFFIRMED A CONTINUING, BUT CHANGE, ROLE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STATED THAT DEFENCE IN THE CENTRAL REGION COULD NO LONGER BE BASED ON THE 'LAYER CAKE' CONCEPT, ALTHOUGH THE CONCEPT OF DEFENDING ALL NATO TERRITORY REMAINED VALID. (FMOD ARE SENDING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WHICH WE WILL COPY TO FCO AND MOD.) COL MARTENS THOUGHT THAT AFTER THE SUMMIT THE NAC WOULD NEED TO WORK OUT MORE DETAILED POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR NATO'S MILITARY PLANNERS.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

6. GOULDEN ADVOCATED A REFERENCE BY THE SUMMIT TO MULTINATIONAL FORCES. WE HOPED THAT BOTH THE US AND FRANCE WOULD PARTICIPATE. BUT IF WE HAD TO CHOOSE, US PARTICIPATION WAS MORE IMPORTANT. THE SUMMIT MIGHT SIGNAL THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING NATO'S COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. THIS COULD HELP FRANCE. GOULDEN ADDED THAT THE FRENCH

OVER-ESTIMATED THE US WILLINGNESS TO KEEP FORCES IN EUROPE: IF THE AMERICANS WERE MADE TO FEEL SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS, OUTSIDE (EUROPEAN) MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES, THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOFSTETTER AGREED, ADDING THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WANTED TO KEEP GERMANY IN THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EUROPEAN MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION COULD PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP. COL MARTENS CONFIRMED THAT, TO AVOID SINGULARISING GERMANY, FMOD WOULD WISH MULTINATIONAL FORCES TO BE STATIONED IN OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES TOO. HOFSTETTER WAS MORE RETICENT.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY

7. THERE WAS READY AGREEMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WANTED A NUCLEAR OR TASM DEBATE AT PRESENT. GOULDEN REFERRED IN PASSING TO COMMENTS (BY GENSCHER'S SPOKESMAN) AT TURNBERRY, WHICH WE HOPED WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGNAL A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE, BUT TIMING AND TACTICS NEEDED MORE THOUGHT. IT WAS AGREED THAT GNR SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE A YARDSTICK FOR CALCULATING THEATRE NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS.

CSCE

8. THERE WAS LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS FOR CSCE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS. HOFSTETTER INITIALLY SAID THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD PROPOSE BOTH A CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE AND A VERIFICATION CENTRE, BUT WAS WILLING TO ENTERTAIN THE IDEA OF A SINGLE CENTRE. (WE KNOW THAT AUSWAERTIGES AMT OFFICIALS ARE SUBMITTING AGAIN RECOMMENDING ACCEPTANCE OF A SINGLE CENTRE, DESPITE THE PUBLIC ESPOUSAL OF TWO CENTRES BY KOHL AND GENSCHER.) IN DISCUSSION IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE GERMANS' PROPOSED VERIFICATION CENTRE WOULD HAVE SIMILAR FUNCTIONS TO OUR PROPOSED RISK REDUCTION CENTRE I.E. PRINCIPALLY CSBM IMPLEMENTATION (WITH CFE HANDLED BY THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP). ROSSBACH (AUS ARMS CONTROL) SUGGESTED THAT THE VERIFICATION CENTRE SHOULD CONTAIN AN 'INSTITUTE' TO COLLECT DATA FROM GOVERNMENTS.

9. GERMAN IDEAS FOR A CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE, WHICH WOULD TAKE UP DISPUTED ISSUES AT THE INITIATIVE OF ONE OR MORE STATES, WERE SUBJECTED TO SCEPTICAL INTERROGATION BY GOULDEN AND MISS NEVILLE-JONES. THEY SAID GOVERNMENTS WOULD WANT TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW DISCUSSION COULD BE TRIGGERED. IN A CONSENSUS BODY, PARTIES TO A DISPUTE WOULD ALWAYS HAVE A VETO. ONE STATE MIGHT BRING A DISPUTE TO THE CENTRE TO HARRASS ANOTHER. ACTIVATION OF THE CENTRE - OR FAILURE TO ACTIVATE IT - COULD ITSELF BECOME A GRIEVANCE. IT WOULD BE

PREMATURE TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENTLY-STAFFED CSCE INSTITUTION WITH SUCH POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES. IF A SINGLE (MULTI PURPOSE) CSCE CENTRE WERE GIVEN A SIMILAR ROLE, THE SAME DIFFICULTIES WOULD APPLY. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE A FLEXIBLE MECHANISM, AVAILABLE TO BE ACTIVATED IN DIFFERENT WAYS ON DIFFERENT ISSUES BUT WITHOUT ANY PERMANENT STAFF. HOFSTETTER PLEADED THAT CSCE HAD PRODUCED USEFUL RESULTS IN THE PAST, SUCH AS THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, DESPITE THE CONSENSUS RULE. GOULDEN CONCLUDED THAT CSCE SECURITY INSTITUTION(S) COULD BE AN IMPORTANT AREA FOR A BRITISH-GERMAN-FRENCH INPUT TO PERSUADE THE US. HOFSTETTER AGREED.

CFE

10. GOULDEN SAID THAT THE SOVIET HARD LINE HERE AND ELSEWHERE (E.G. START) WAS A PRODUCT OF DOMESTIC WEAKNESS. NOW WAS NOT (NOT) THE TIME FOR MORE WESTERN CONCESSIONS, E.G. ON AIRCRAFT. THE HLTF HAD AGREED THAT THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD NOT OFFER ANY FURTHER MOVES. ROSSBACH RESPONDED THAT THE FRG HAD NOT ASKED FOR NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS, BUT WOULD PREFER TO USE THE FLEXIBILITY ON AIRCRAFT AGREED BY THE HLTF IN ONE STEP. THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL CAPABLE OF ACTING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS (E.G. OVER TANKS/ACVS), SO HE COULD NOT AGREE THAT IT WAS NOT A TIME FOR ANY CONCESSIONS. THE FRG DELEGATION HAD REPORTED THAT IN CONNECTION WITH GERMAN UNIFICATION THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT ASK FOR LIMITATIONS NOT JUST ON GERMAN MANPOWER BUT ALSO GERMAN TLES, TO BE AGREED IN 2 PLUS 4. GOULDEN SAID WE COULD SEE A WAY OF LIMITING MANPOWER WHICH WOULD NOT SINGULARISE GERMANY, BUT LIMITATION OF GERMAN TLES WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE SINGULARISATION.

11. ON MANPOWER, ROSSBACH ARGUED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PROMISE IN CFE 1 TO NEGOTIATE A LIMIT IN CFE 1A AND INSERTING THE LIMIT IN CFE 1. GOULDEN WARNED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT TO LIMIT OTHER THAN US/SOVIET MANPOWER IN CFE 1. THE GERMAN PROMISE FOR CFE 1A SHOULD PERHAPS BE TIME-LIMITED, IN CASE CFE 1A FAILED TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT. OTHERWISE GERMANY MIGHT FIND THAT ONLY ITS FORCE LEVELS WERE LIMITED. ROSSBACH NOTED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAD STILL TO BE AGREED. OVER LUNCH THERE WAS INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING NATIONAL FORCE LEVELS IN CFE 1A WITHOUT ANY COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, WITH EFFECTIVELY ONLY ONE YEAR FOR NEGOTIATION. GOULDEN SUGGESTED THAT EACH STATE MIGHT DECLARE NOT JUST FORCE CEILINGS BUT ITS FORCE DEFINITIONS, GIVEN NATIONAL DIFFERENCES. VERIFICATION COULD BE THE SAME AS FOR US AND SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER I.E. VERY LIGHT.

MALLABY

CONFIDENTIAL

106762
MDLIAN 2769

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 800

OF 291510Z JUNE 90

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA

PART 2 OF 2

SIC

MODUK FOR AUS (POL), DACU AND SEC (NATO/UK) (P)

UK-FRG POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS: BONN, 27 JUNE

SNF

12. BOTH SIDES WERE CONTENT WITH TURNBERRY DECISION THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD SIMPLY SET UP THE CONSULATIVE GROUP. ROSSBACH EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR ALL COUNTRIES WITH COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS TO TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. GOULDEN SAID OUR PREFERENCE WAS NOT TO PARTICIPATE, ALTHOUGH NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. LIMITING NSWP SYSTEMS WAS ONLY A SUSIDIARY OBJECTIVE. THE PERSHING 1A SOLUTION (SEPARATE DECLARATION) WAS ONE OPTION FOR WESTERN COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS. BRITISH MINDS WERE ALSO STILL OPEN ON WHETHER AIR-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INCLUDED. OUR SINGLE OBJECTIVE WAS TO PRESERVE A CREDIBLE THREATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WOULD NOT BE TOO TIGHT A CONSTRAINT. ROSSBACH SAID THAT ZERO LAND-BASED SNF WOULD BE A GERMAN OBJECTIVE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOFSTETTER SAID THE FRG WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF DENUCLEARISATION. BUT THERE WAS NO STRATEGIC REASON ANY MORE FOR LAND-BASED MISSILES OR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THERE WAS TASM OR NOT. GOULDEN SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO LIMIT OUR AIR-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS AND PREVENT THEIR MODERNISATION: WE MUST PROCEED WITH FORESIGHT AND CAUTION.

13. OVER LUNCH THE GERMANS SUGGESTED THAT THE NATO SUMMIT MIGHT DECLARE OUR READINESS TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY FROM EUROPE. GOULDEN SAID WE WOULD PREFER THE SUMMIT TO SAY NOTHING SPECIFIC, NOT BECAUSE OF A WISH TO PRESERVE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, BUT BECAUSE OUR POSITION WAS NOT YET SETTLED, AND WE HAD LITTLE MARGIN FOR MANOEUVRE. THE GERMANS THOUGHT THAT ATACMS WOULD BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. GOULDEN DISAGREED: IF WE WANTED TO ELIMINATE

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

ALL SOVIET MISSILES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL, THEY WOULD DEMAND THE SAME, WHICH WOULD MEAN ABOLISHING ATACMS. THIS WAS A SERIOUS DILEMMA. MANN (MOD) EXPLAINED THAT ATACMS AND MLRS HAD A COMMON LAUNCH VEHICLE. FOTL HAD NEVER BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED, SO IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT ATACMS SHOULD NOT COUNT AS A NUCLEAR SYSTEM. BUT IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO SCRAP ALL LAUNCH VEHICLES THIS POSITION WOULD NOT BE TENABLE. GOULDEN ADDED THAT WARHEADS WERE UNVERIFIABLE

CBMS

14. ROSSBACH SAID THE CSBM NEGOTIATION NEEDED ''POLITICAL IMPULSES''. HE WOULD ADVISE GENSCHER THAT IF HE STILL WANTED A CSBM AGREEMENT THIS YEAR, HE SHOULD START RAISING THE ISSUE WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS. GOULDEN SAID THE UK STILL WANTED A CSBM AGREEMENT BY THE CSCE SUMMIT. BUT LIKE OPEN SKIES, CSBMS MIGHT BE A CASUALTY OF PARALYSIS IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. IF SO, THIS WOULD NOT BE DISASTROUS: BOTH WERE LESSER PRIORITIES. ROSSBACH AGREED.

2 PLUS 4: POL/MIL ASPECTS

15. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVIET WISH TO AGREE LIMITS ON GERMAN FORCES IN 2 PLUS 4 RATHER THAN IN CFE WAS UNACCEPTABLE. GROENING (2 PLUS 4 STAFF) DISTINGUISHED THREE CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN FORCES ON GERMAN SOIL:

A) SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A BILATERAL GERMAN/WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WOULD BE PART OF THE FINAL SETTLEMENT. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SUCH AS AIR DEFENCE AND EXERCISING HAD NOT YET BEEN ADDRESSED.

B) BERLIN: THE SOVIET FORCES SHOULD LEAVE. A NEW LEGAL BASIS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR THE WESTERN FORCES. THE 1 PLUS 3 HAD NOT YET AGREED WHETHER THEIR PRESENCE SHOULD BE LINKED TO THAT OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR.

C) ALLIED STATIONED FORCES IN THE FRG. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES CONVENTION WOULD EXPIRE WITH THE FINAL SETTLEMENT. DISCUSSION WITH ALLIES, NOT IN THE 2 PLUS 4, WAS NEEDED.

16. GOULDEN STRESSED THAT ALL ALLIES HAD AN INTEREST IN WHAT THE GERMANS AGREED ABOUT SOVIET FORCES. AS FOR BERLIN, THE GERMANS MUST MAKE THEIR WISHES CLEAR. THE UK WAS LOOKING AT DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

IN GERMANY IT WOULD HELP TO KNOW GERMAN WISHES ABOUT BERLIN. AS FOR ALLIED FORCES IN THE FRG, THE OPTIONS NEEDED FURTHER DISCUSSION. GROENING THOUGHT THAT, DEPENDING ON HOW THEY DID IT, THE SOVIET UNION COULD MAKE POLITICAL MILEAGE IN GERMANY BUT IF AN ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY ALL FOREIGN FORCES IN GERMANY AS BEING ON THE SAME FOOTING. HOFSTETTER CONFIRMED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROSPECT OF US AND BRITISH FORCE REDUCTIONS IN GERMANY WOULD EASE THE PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEM. BRITISH FORCES WERE WELCOME IN GERMANY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

CW

17. GOULDEN EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT THE EXCHANGE OF PRACTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. THE RECENT CHANGE IN THE UK POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BRING OUR POLICIES CLOSER.

WEU

18. READY AGREEMENT, WITH SOME POST-PRANDIAL MIRTH, THAT WEU WAS AN EGG TO BE KEPT WARM BUT WHICH WOULD NOT HATCH FOR A LONG TIME. BOTH UK AND FRG HAD HAD DEMARCHES FROM TURKEY ASKING US TO KEEP GREECE OUT OF WEU. HOFSTETTER CONFIRMED THAT THE FRG WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SATELLITE STUDY BUT WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT, BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL COST.

OPEN SKIES

19. GOULDEN SAID THAT AERIAL INSPECTION WAS NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN VIENNA, AND SHOULD STAY THERE. THERE WAS NO POINT IN ANOTHER OPEN SKIES MEETING UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION CHANGED POSITION (AND THE US TOO, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD SHIFT IF THE RUSSIANS DID). WE SHOULD KEEP THE BLAME PINNED ON THE SOVIET UNION.

MALLABY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

174

MAIN

158

.NATO
LIMITED
SECPOL D
ACDD
DEFENCE D

NEWS D
INFO D
RMD
RAD
ECD(I)

CONFIDENTIAL

106762
MDLIAN 2

ESED
NPD
NATO SUMMIT UNIT
SOVIET D
KIEV UNIT
EED
JAU/EED
CSCE UNIT
PLANNERS
WED
SED
PUSD
NAD

ECD(E)
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MR MAUDE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR BROOMFIELD
MR GOULDEN
MR KERR
MR GREENSTOCK
MR LING
MR MCLAREN
MR TAIT

ADDITIONAL 16

NATO

NNNN