

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification	Caveat	Precedence
		CONFIDENTIAL		DESBKY 271000Z

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEAT	3	
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TO	5	TO DESBKY 271000Z BONN
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OF	7	OF 262100Z OCTOBER 90
AND TO	8	IMMEDIATE AMMAN
	9	INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW,
	10	ANKARA , <u>UNDER CISE UGMA</u> <u>UNDER NATO</u>
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	12	FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
	13	SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO GERMANY, 26 OCTOBER :
	14	TALKS WITH GENSCHER
	15	
	16	SUMMARY
	17	
	18	1. Genschler takes similar line to Kohl over EMU i.e. no
	19	pressure for decision on Stage II at this point. Genschler
	20	relatively sanguine about future of the Soviet Union but worried
	21	about position of Soviet troops in East Germany and hostility to
	22	them. Poland: Genschler says he would have preferred one treaty
	23	dealing only with the border. There are now to be 2 treaties.
	24	Border treaty relatively simple, but friendship treaty
	25	complicated by the resurrection of old disagreements. Alliance
///	26	issues: Genschler's thinking similar to our own i.e. he wants no
//	27	developments which put at risk the Americans' commitment to, and
/	28	presence in, Europe.
	29	

YYYY		Catchword:	
MAIN	File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)
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Authorised for	Initials	Date/time	
despatch by:	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>26/10</i>	
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DETAIL

2. The Secretary of State had a working lunch with Genscher in the latter's home town of Halle where Genscher is the local hero.

MIDDLE EAST

3. The Secretary of State and Genscher compared notes. The Secretary of State gave his impressions from his recent visit. Genscher said Germany's relations with Israel were basically good. Because of the past Germany had kept a relatively low profile. For the same reasons, he had refused as Foreign Minister to receive representatives of the PLO, a position which the PLO appeared to understand, and was obviously appreciated by the Israelis. Genscher said Germany's position on Palestinian self-determination was the same as the UKs.

HELP FOR JORDAN

4. The Secretary of State set out the case for help for Jordan. Genscher undertook to look into it. Grateful if HMA Amman could tell the Jordanians that we have taken this action.

EMU

5. The Secretary of State described our position and the damage which would be done to the negotiating process if there were pressure at the European Council to settle a start date for Stage II. Genscher doubted whether the issue would be at the centre of discussion. The Summit had originally been called to discuss the German question and CSCE. Genscher had advised De Michelis to concentrate on the CSCE and to leave the IGCs to

December. The European Council should also deal with the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and help for Eastern Europe. It would be wrong to have EMU and political union as the most important issues. The Secretary of State raised the GATT. Genscher said he had spoken to Keichle and was confident that the Commission would be making proposals acceptable to Germany.

SOVIET UNION

6. Genscher said there were some countries which had a certain stability due to their size, which gave them a natural balance of their own and made them less prey to revolutions than smaller countries. The Soviet Union was such a country though its very size made it harder for political decisions to be taken. Economic reform would take a long time. But the Soviet Union had a considerable capacity to endure. There would be development opportunities particularly in the Baltic States where there were people who still knew what it was to run an economy. Genscher doubted whether the relationship between the centre and the republics could be regulated by law. Basically Gorbachev was a man riding several horses at once. The Secretary of State described his meeting with Yeltsin in September. Genscher thought that the Soviet Union could become a disaster if the point came where we no longer knew who could speak for the country as a whole. He was also worried about what would happen to the Red Army. ~~The Russians insisted on having their own soldiers.~~ There was a lot of tension among Soviet army families in East Germany. They had heard about the hardships being suffered by those who had gone back to the USSR from Czechoslovakia. Most of the Russian wives in the GDR had had jobs but had been the first to become redundant. Russian soldiers in West Germany never left their barracks unless accompanied by an officer. They were afraid of the changes

going on in Germany and had no real hopes for the future in their own country. In discussion with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze after the signature of the 2 + 4 Genscher had spent half his time on this issue. He had even offered to accompany Shevardnadze to the barracks. He was worried about relations between the Red Army and the local people. This had never been a relationship of allies. There was no question of consultations on issues such as low flying. The Soviet commander had simply taken the decisions and implemented them. There had been no social contact between the Russians and the East Germans. Many of the barracks represented an environmental hazard. The local people were actively hostile to the Soviet troops in some areas. Genscher would have preferred a 2 to 3 year period before their withdrawal but this had not proved possible. The German government was ready to build houses for the Soviet troops and their families, but it was doubtful whether anybody could provide the necessary infrastructure of lighting, drainage etc.

POLAND

7. Genscher hoped Mazowiecki would win the presidential elections. Walesa's unpredictability could cause real problems. There would now definitely be 2 treaties with Poland. The second on the future relationship would be very complicated. For 40 years the Poles had denied the existence of a German minority in Poland. Now they acknowledged it but countered with requests for compensation for Poles who had suffered during the war. Some Germans wanted to make claims in respect of private property in Silesia etc. As far as the FDP was concerned a single treaty would have been sufficient but the second treaty was necessary for the CDU because of their links with refugee organisations.

European pillar had to be a pillar within the Alliance. He was sceptical about the Euro Group and was concerned at talk of an Alliance within the European Community. We ^{SHOULD} ~~shall~~ create new ties between Europe and North America rather than devising completely new structures. There had been discussion in the past of multinational units within the WEU. But that would mean excluding the US. If you had ~~a~~ European multinational ^{UNITS} ~~force~~ where would that leave the Americans? Any multinational units must be within NATO.

12. The Secretary of State said that Genscher's thinking was close to our own. A big gap was opening up between the proportion of GDP being spent by the US compared with the Europeans. We would have to show greater coherence on the European side. Multinational units within NATO were ~~a good one~~ example. How could we bring the French back in? Genscher said he did not know. Our over-riding concern must be not to lose the US. Genscher said that his Political Director, Kastrup, was the person in charge of thinking on this subject in the Foreign Ministry. It was agreed that we would talk to him.

CSCE

13. The Secretary of State mentioned our idea of a human rights Magna Carta within the declaration which would come out of the Summit. Genscher saw no problem with this, and was aware that a text had already been agreed among officials in the Twelve.

TURKEY

14. Genscher agreed with the Secretary of State that we could not allow Turkey to become a full member of the European Community, but we had to do something to bind Turkey into Europe

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

PS/PUS

MR WESTON

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR MCLAREN

MR JAY

MR GOULDEN

HEADS OF: WED

NENAD

ECD(E)

EED

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NEWS DEPT
SPECIAL ADVISERS (2)

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