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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER:

7 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. IN TALKS LASTING 75 MINUTES (SHORT TETE-A-TETE AND WORKING LUNCH) IN LONDON ON 7 FEBRUARY, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, ROLAND DUMAS, DISCUSSED:
 - POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GULF AND MIDDLE EAST
 - QUAI SECRETARY-GENERAL SCHEER'S VISIT TO IRAN
 - IRAQ INTERNAL
 - GULF WAR AIMS
 - JORDAN
 - MAGHREB
 - UK/FRENCH PRESS REACTIONS
 - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE IGCS
 - TETE-A-TETE: G7 POLITICAL DIRECTORS, PROTECTION FOR THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, AND THE ELF/AMOCO UK MERGER.
2. THE TALKS FOLLOWED ON FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH DUMAS IN PARIS ON 24 JANUARY. DUMAS WAS MORE RELAXED, OPEN AND HUMOROUS. HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FLESHED OUT A LITTLE MORE THEIR MAIN LINES OF THINKING ON THE POST-WAR ISSUES. THEY AGREED THAT UK AND FRENCH OFFICIALS SHOULD MEET TO PURSUE THEM IN MORE DETAIL.
3. ON EUROPE, DUMAS SOUGHT OUR INITIAL REACTION TO THE FRANCO-GERMAN PAPER ON CFSP. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERTOOK TO RESPOND LATER WITH SOME CONSIDERED, PERSONAL REACTIONS.

DETAIL

POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS IN GULF AND MIDDLE EAST

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVING THESE ISSUES MUCH THOUGHT SINCE THEIR MEETING IN PARIS. HE SAW THREE MAIN CHALLENGES. FIRST, INITIAL SECURITY IN THE GULF. THE LOCAL STATES WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF US, UK AND FRENCH

GUARANTEES. THE KUWAITIS WANTED THESE TO BE ON A BILATERAL BASIS. THIS WAS UNREALISTIC. SECOND, THE WIDER SECURITY FRAMEWORK REQUIRED IN THE REGION. THIS WAS RELATED TO SOME OF THE CSCM IDEAS WHICH HE KNEW DUMAS HAD BEEN EXPLORING WITH DE MICHELIS AND OTHERS. THIRD, THERE WAS ARAB/ISRAEL. IT WAS NOW CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE US WANTED TO PURSUE THIS THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY WITH NO PRECIPITATE MOVE TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY BAKER THAT QUIET DIPLOMACY ALONE WAS NOT AN OPTION BECAUSE OF PUBLIC DEMAND FOR MORE VISIBLE ACTION. EXPECTATIONS FOR EARLY POST-WAR ACTIVITY ON ARAB/ISRAEL WERE HIGH. IN ALL THESE AREAS, OUR THINKING WAS STILL VERY PRIMITIVE. MORE WORRYING WAS THAT ARAB IDEAS WERE ALSO UNDEVELOPED.

5. DUMAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS GREAT DEMAND ALREADY FOR GOVERNMENTS TO BE THINKING ABOUT POST-WAR ISSUES. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WOULD BE ADDRESSING THE NATION THAT EVENING, PARTLY TO RESPOND TO THIS DEMAND. HE WOULD BE SETTING OUT SOME BROAD IDEAS. THE POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION WOULD NEED TO BE BASED ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES:

- REGIONAL STABILITY
- GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION
- RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS
- RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
- CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMS SALES.

MITTERRAND WOULD PUT THE CASE FOR A CONFERENCE, IN WHICH THESE ISSUES AND PRINCIPLES COULD BE DISCUSSED, AND WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH GUIDELINES.

6. DUMAS CONTINUED THAT ANY AGREEMENTS IN THESE AREAS WOULD NEED TO BE GUARANTEED. THE FRENCH SAW A PARTICULAR ROLE FOR THE PERMANENT FIVE AND WOULD NOT EXCLUDE AN EVENTUAL MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FIVE. THE AGENDA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE ARAB/ISRAEL, LEBANON AND THE GULF. EACH ISSUE WOULD HAVE ITS OWN SEPARATE INTERNAL STRUCTURE. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO AVOID RAISING THESE ISSUES (THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED). IN PARTICULAR, ISRAEL COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND ON THE STATUS QUO OR TO CONTINUE TO DENY THAT THEY HAD ANY VALID PALESTINIAN INTERLOCUTORS.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE SAW THE ISSUES SIMILARLY. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION HAD TO BE RESOLVED OR IT WOULD BE A ROCK WHICH WOULD SINK EVERY SHIP WE LAUNCHED. EVEN THE SHAMIR PLAN HAD FORESEEN A PROCESS INVOLVING CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS. OUR THOUGHTS WERE TURNING TOWARDS FINDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH AN ELECTORAL PROCESS. HE HAD ASKED OFFICIALS TO THINK THIS THROUGH MORE PRECISELY. HE

HOPED UK AND FRENCH OFFICIALS COULD GET TOGETHER TO EXPLORE THE OPTIONS IN DETAIL.

8. DUMAS ASKED WHETHER WE FORESAW DISCUSSION AMONG THE TWELVE. FRANKLY, THE ONLY REAL PLAYERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE THE US AND, AMONG THE EUROPEANS, THE UK AND FRANCE. BUT FOR FORM'S SAKE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE THE TWELVE.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD A VERY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT ANY ATTRACTION WASHINGTON HAD SEEN IN INVOLVING THE FIVE HAD NOW WANED - LARGELY BECAUSE OF US UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE SOVIET ROLE. BUT THE WHOLE ISSUE OF GUARANTEES RAISED BIG PROBLEMS. WOULD FRANCE REALLY BE WILLING TO GIVE SUCH GUARANTEES AS DUMAS HAD DESCRIBED? THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT EXPLORED THIS QUESTION. IT WOULD BE A BIG STEP TO GUARANTEE FRONTIERS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

10. DUMAS SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITHIN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, ONLY WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HIMSELF, WHO WAS OPEN TO THE IDEA. THE ISSUE AT THE START OF A CONFERENCE WOULD BE WHETHER WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER GUARANTEES IN PRINCIPLE. WHAT THOSE GUARANTEES MIGHT BE IN DETAIL WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT WAS AGREED AT THE CONFERENCE. THE FRENCH AT THIS STAGE DID NOT EXCLUDE SUCH GUARANTEES.

11. DUMAS ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN HAPPY, AT LEAST WHEN SHEVARDNADZE WAS FOREIGN MINISTER, TO GO ALONG WITH US IDEAS FOR A BILATERAL APPROACH TO THE REGION. THE BAKER/BESSMERTNYCH STATEMENT ON THE GULF SHOWED THAT THIS MIGHT CONTINUE. BUT FRANCE AND THE UK COULD NOT LET THEMSELVES BE EXCLUDED IN THIS WAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WAS NOT YET CLEAR ABOUT BESSMERTNYCH APPROACH. THE STATEMENT MIGHT NOT BE A GOOD INDICATOR - PRESIDENT BUSH AFTER ALL HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF IT EITHER.

12. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, DUMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IN THE FRENCH CONCEPTION, WOULD BE CONVENED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. ANY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO NEED VERY CAREFUL PREPARATION. THE QUESTION WAS WHO SHOULD DO THIS. FRANCE'S ANSWER WAS THE PERMANENT FIVE. BUT THE US RESISTED BECAUSE OF ISRAELI FEARS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL. BUT THIS WAS NOT TRUE - IT WOULD BE ONLY ONE ITEM ON THE CONFERENCE AGENDA. AN ISRAELI-INSPIRED INTERDICTION ON DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE COULD NOT BE TOLERATED.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT AS SOON AS THE FIGHTING ENDED, WE HAD TO SHOW THAT WE WERE ACTIVE ON ARAB/ISRAEL. IT WOULD NOT BE SAFE TO ALLOW A GAP. BUT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT HOW TO LAUNCH THIS ACTIVITY. HE HAD DISCUSSED IT BY TELEPHONE WITH

SECRETARY BAKER BUT IT COULD NOT BE TAKEN FAR WITH THE US NOW. THEIR OFFICIALS WERE OVERWHELMINGLY TAKEN UP WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. BAKER'S EVIDENCE TO CONGRESS YESTERDAY WAS THE FIRST SIGN OF US THINKING. IT WAS URGENT TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES, BECAUSE IN LITTLE MORE THAN A MONTH THEY MIGHT BE UPON US. THERE WERE SEVERAL OPTIONS: THE UK AND FRANCE COULD EXPLORE THE ISSUES IN DETAIL BETWEEN THEMSELVES, OR DUMAS, HE AND BAKER COULD TRY TO GET TOGETHER, OR THEY COULD BRING IN THE FRG AS WELL, WHO HAD NO MILITARY BUT AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ROLE. OF COURSE, ALSO, WE HAD TO LOOK FOR IDEAS FROM THE REGION. BUT HE DID NOT FEEL, FRANKLY, THAT INVOLVEMENT OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WOULD BE POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE.

14. DUMAS AGAIN REHEARSED THE DIFFICULTIES. EACH OF THE REGIONAL PLAYERS HAD INCOMPATIBLE IDEAS ON WHAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED URGENTLY AND WHAT HAD TO BE EXCLUDED FROM DISCUSSION. BUT THE WEST HAD TO TACKLE THIS. OUR FORCES WERE NOW FIGHTING, AND WOULD SOON BE DYING, IN THE GULF. WE COULD NOT REPEAT THIS EXERCISE EVERY 10 YEARS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED BUT WHAT WOULD BE THE BEST MECHANISM? HE HAD SPOKEN IN BRUSSELS ON 4 FEBRUARY OF ACTIVATING THE EC/US DECLARATION, IE WITH A MEETING OF BAKER AND THE TWELVE FOREIGN MINISTERS. THERE WERE THE OTHER OPTIONS HE HAD ALREADY DESCRIBED. PERHAPS BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFICIALS SHOULD TRY TO FIND A FORMULA. DUMAS AGREED THAT EXPERTS SHOULD MEET, PERHAPS 3 OR 4 ON EACH SIDE, TO EXPLORE ALL THIS IN GREATER DETAIL. (DUMAS AFTERWARDS TOLD THE PRESS HE ENVISAGED CLOSE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON A RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE GULF.)

15. FOR OTHER ISSUES, SEE MY 3 IFTS.

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